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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 10-2866 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v. 
 
CORBIN THOMAS 
a/k/a 
JACK 
a/k/a 
PATRICK 
a/k/a 
FRANCIS WALCOTT 
 
       Corbin Thomas, 
                                Appellant 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-98-cr-00136-001) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 24, 2012 
___________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN and VANASKIE, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 10, 2013) 
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___________ 
 
OPINION 
__________ 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 
 Corbin Thomas appeals the District Court’s order 
denying his motion for an extension of time to file a motion 
for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and requests a 
certificate of appealability (“COA”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2253.  For the reasons discussed below, we will grant 
Thomas’ request for a COA1
                                                 
1  We assume, without deciding, that a COA is required to 
appeal from the District Court’s order denying Thomas’ 
motion for an extension of time.  Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“unless a circuit justice or judge 
issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be 
taken to the court of appeals . . .”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c)(1)).  Because we ultimately conclude that issues 
raised in this appeal warrant appellate review, we grant 
Thomas’ request for a COA.  See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 
(“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must show . . . 
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 
encouragement to proceed further.”) (internal quotation 
omitted).  See also infra pp. 16-17 (addressing Thomas’ 
request to convert COA application into § 2255 motion for 
relief). 
 and affirm the District Court’s 
order denying his motion for an extension of time. 
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I. 
 
 From 1990 to 1995, Thomas was the director of a 
criminal enterprise that transported thousands of pounds of 
marijuana from California to Pennsylvania.  Thomas’ wife 
was murdered in 1995, and later that year he fled from the 
United States to Jamaica.  On March 25, 1998, a federal 
grand jury returned a 33-count indictment against Thomas 
based on his marijuana enterprise.  In November 2001, 
Thomas was arrested in the United Kingdom pursuant to a 
provisional extradition warrant.  He contested that warrant 
until 2005.  During April of that year, he was finally brought 
before the District Court for prosecution on the charges 
contained in the 1998 indictment.  He was subsequently 
convicted of numerous offenses and sentenced to a total of 
420 months imprisonment.  We affirmed on direct appeal, and 
on June 15, 2009 the United States Supreme Court denied 
Thomas’ petition for certiorari. 
 
 As a federal prisoner, Thomas could file a motion to 
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence in the District Court 
within one year from denial of certiorari.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(f).  However, during that period, Thomas was 
temporarily transferred to state custody, convicted of his 
wife’s murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment.  
Specifically, Thomas was in state custody at the time his 
certiorari petition in this case was denied (June 15, 2009), he 
remained there until August 4, 2009 (a period of 
approximately 50-days), and was again in state custody from 
February 25, 2010 until May 6, 2010 (a period of 
approximately 80-days).  On May 24, 2010, approximately 
three weeks before Thomas’ deadline for filing a motion for 
relief under § 2255, he filed a pro se motion for a 120-day 
extension of time.  He argued that extra time was warranted 
because he was in state custody without access to legal 
materials needed to prepare his § 2255 motion for over 120-
days during the one year limitations period. 
 
 On June 7, 2010, the District Court entered an order 
denying Thomas’ motion for an extension of time.  In doing 
so, it explained, in a footnote, that Thomas “failed to 
demonstrate why the one (1) year period of limitation should 
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not apply under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f).”  See United States v. 
Thomas, No. 98-CR-00136-001 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2010) 
(order denying motion for an extension of time). 
 
 Thomas appealed that order, but he never filed an 
actual motion for relief under § 2255.  Instead, he submitted 
an application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to the 
District Court in an effort to again appeal its denial of his 
motion for an extension of time.  Thomas’ COA application 
restated that he had been in state custody without access to 
legal materials, and also asserted “a Batson challenge[] to the 
jury selection; Prosecutorial Misconduct for knowingly 
withholding material evidence of Petitioner’s innocence, in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland; and Jury Misconduct.”  App. 
at A33-34; 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
The District Court did not rule on his COA application.  
Rather, it referred his COA application to us—apparently 
because Thomas’ appeal from the denial of his motion for 
extra time was pending.  Accordingly, we now review the 
District Court’s denial of Thomas’ motion and decide 
whether he should be entitled to a COA. 
 
II. 
 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
However, before evaluating the merits of Thomas’ appeal, we 
must determine whether the District Court had jurisdiction to 
enter its order denying Thomas’ motion for extra time.  See 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 
(1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a 
threshold matter springs ‘from the nature and limits of the 
judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and 
without exception.’”) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. 
v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 
 
 The judicial power of federal courts is limited to 
“cases and controversies.”  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., -- U.S. --, 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 
(2013).  A judicial decision rendered in the absence of a case 
or controversy is advisory, and federal courts lack power to 
render advisory opinions.  See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. 
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993). 
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A. 
 
 This case arises under “[t]he Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), [which] 
enacted the present 28 U.S.C. § 2254” and § 2255.  Lindh v. 
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322 (1997).  Section 2254 gives 
federal courts jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to prisoners 
held in state custody, and § 2255 does the same for federal 
prisoners.  It is well-settled that a § 2254 petition submitted 
by a state prisoner initiates a civil, rather than criminal, action 
for relief.  See Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 167 (3d 
Cir. 1998); Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 
257, 269 (1978); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60 
(1883) (“The prosecution against him is a criminal 
prosecution, but the writ of habeas corpus which he has 
obtained is not a proceeding in that prosecution.  On the 
contrary, it is a new suit brought by him to enforce a civil 
right . . .”).2
 
  Therefore, no case or controversy generally 
exists before an actual § 2254 petition is filed.  Cf. Barden v. 
Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“[J]urisdiction over a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
determined when the petition is filed.”) (citing Ross v. 
Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976)).   
 However, courts consider, among other things, judicial 
economy and the legal sophistication of  pro se litigants when 
evaluating AEDPA matters.  See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 
197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999); Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 
788, 810 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In the interest of judicial 
economy, however, we briefly consider the merits of 
[appellant’s] claim.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)).  In 
light of such considerations, mislabeled motions, or those 
preceding a formal request for substantive relief, are 
sometimes recharacterized as requests for relief under 
AEDPA.  See Miller, 197 F.3d at 648 (“federal courts have 
long recognized that they have an obligation to look behind 
the label of a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine 
                                                 
2  Ex parte Tom Tong was decided before Congress’s 1948 
amendment to the judicial code that established separate 
procedural postures for habeas proceedings based on state and 
federal court judgments.  See infra pp. 8-10; 108 U.S. 556. 
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whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a different 
remedial statutory framework) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 
2255); Mason v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 418-19 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(applying Miller’s rule for recharacterizing AEDPA filings to 
§ 2254).3
 
  Jurisdictional issues that may arise by exercising 
judicial power in the absence of a formal request for habeas 
relief are thereby avoided.  See id.  This appeal is a matter of 
first impression in this Circuit, as it requires that we 
determine the necessity of such an approach under § 2255, as 
well as the more pressing question of whether a sentencing 
court has jurisdiction over § 2255 preliminary matters before 
a formal request for § 2255 relief is filed. 
 This latter issue arose in United States v. Leon, where 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluated 
whether there was jurisdiction to rule on a motion for an 
extension of time to file a § 2255 motion before an actual § 
2255 motion was filed.  203 F.3d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2000).  
There, the court held that a district court could not rule on 
such a motion because no case or controversy exists until a 
formal request for § 2255 relief is made.  See id. at 164 
(“because [appellant] has not yet filed an actual § 2255 
petition, there is no case or controversy to be heard, and any 
opinion . . .  render[ed] on the timeliness issue would be 
merely advisory.”).  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
implicitly viewed proceedings under §§ 2254 and 2255 as 
different sides of the same coin for purposes of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See id.; Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 82-
83 (2d Cir. 2001).  That is, it essentially viewed § 2255 
proceedings as civil actions separate from prisoners’ 
underlying criminal cases, which is how motions under § 
2254 have been viewed. 
 
 We disagree with the court’s holding in Leon because, 
                                                 
3  Before recharacterizing a motion under AEDPA, a court 
should inform a prisoner that she can have her motion (1) 
ruled upon as filed, or (2) recharacterized as requesting 
habeas relief and heard as such but lose her ability to file a 
successive request absent authorization from this Court under 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).  See, e.g., Miller, 197 F.3d at 652; 
Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 
7 
 
although certain aspects of a § 2255 proceeding may be 
considered civil,4
 
 a § 2255 proceeding is a continuation of a 
defendant’s federal criminal case.  See infra pp. 7-14.  As a 
result, under § 2255, a motion for an extension of time can be 
decided prior to a formal request for relief because the 
underlying prosecution satisfies Article III’s case or 
controversy requirement. 
 A review of the legislative history of § 2255 clarifies 
this jurisdictional nuance.  See United States v. Williams, 675 
F.3d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Where the statutory language 
does not express Congress’ intent unequivocally, a court 
traditionally refers to the legislative history and the 
atmosphere in which the statute was enacted in attempt to 
determine the congressional purpose.”) (quoting United States 
v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 275 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 
B. 
 
 The authority of federal courts to issue writs of habeas 
corpus originates in the Constitution and was first given effect 
in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; 
Powell v. Rice, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1976).  Initially, the 
Act only applied to federal prisoners, and it empowered 
district courts in the jurisdiction where federal prisoners were 
confined to adjudicate requests for habeas relief.  See id. at 
475; Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211 (1952).  In 1867, the Act 
was amended to extend the authority of district courts to state 
prisoners seeking habeas relief, but it continued to require 
that petitions be submitted to the district court where a 
prisoner was confined.  See id.  In 1942, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States charged a committee of 
federal judges with the duty of thoroughly examining habeas 
procedure in order to develop prudent reforms.  See Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205 at 214.  Statistics showed that the volume of 
habeas cases nearly tripled between 1936 and 1945, and that 
the burden of this increase was primarily born by a small 
number of district courts in jurisdictions where federal 
prisons were located.  Id.  at 212 n.13, 214.5
                                                 
4  See infra p. 14 n.11. 
  Courts in such 
5  “Of all habeas corpus applications filed by federal 
prisoners, 63% were filed in but five of the eighty-four 
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areas were “required to handle an inordinate number of 
habeas corpus actions far from the scene of the facts, the 
homes of the witnesses and the records of the sentencing 
court solely because of the fortuitous concentration of federal 
prisoners within the district.”  Id. at 214.6
 
 
 To rectify this problem, the Conference proposed 
“requiring prisoners convicted in federal courts to apply by 
motion in the sentencing court instead of making application 
for habeas corpus in the district in which they are confined.”  
Id. at 215 (internal citation omitted).  In a 1948 revision of the 
Judicial Code, Congress adopted the Conference’s 
recommended approach by amending the Code through two 
bills: (1) a “procedural bill” which provided that state 
prisoners shall file petitions for habeas corpus in state courts, 
or in the federal district of incarceration if exceptional 
circumstances exist; and (2) a “jurisdictional bill” “requiring 
prisoners convicted in federal courts to apply by motion in the 
sentencing court instead of making application for habeas 
corpus in the district in which they are confined.”  Id.; see 
also H.R. 4342 and S. 1452, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (procedural 
bill); H.R. 4233 and S.1451, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. 
(jurisdictional bill).  In developing these reforms, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee of the 80th Congress issued a Report 
which stated that “[t]he legal and practical considerations for 
a different approach, in Federal court habeas proceedings, to 
sentences in State courts and to sentences in Federal courts is 
evident and has long been recognized by the Congress and the 
courts.”  S. Rep. No. 1526, at 1 (1948) (Comm. Rep.).  The 
Report explained that the “main advantages of such [a] 
motion remedy over the present habeas corpus are as 
                                                                                                             
District Courts.”  Hayman, 342 U.S. at 214 n.18; see also 
William H. Speck, STATISTICS ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS, 
10 Ohio St. L.J. 337 (1949). 
 
6  Cf. Rule 7, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings in the 
United States District Courts, Advisory Committee Notes (“It 
is less likely that the court will feel the need to expand the 
record in a § 2255 proceeding than in a habeas corpus 
proceeding, because the trial (or sentencing) judge is the one 
hearing the motion (see Rule 4) and should already have a 
complete file on the case in his possession.”).   
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follows:” 
 
[H]abeas corpus is a separate 
civil action and not a further step 
in the criminal case in which 
petitioner is sentenced (Ex parte 
Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 
(1883)).  It is not a determination 
of guilt or innocence of the charge 
upon which petitioner was 
sentenced.  Where a prisoner 
sustains a right to discharge in 
habeas corpus, it is usually 
because some right—such as a 
lack of counsel—has been denied 
which reflects no determination of 
his guilt or innocence but affects 
solely the fairness of his earlier 
criminal trial.  Even under the 
broad power in the statute “to 
dispose of the party as law and 
justice require,” the court or judge 
is by no means in the same 
advantageous position in habeas 
corpus to do justice as would be 
so if the matter were determined 
in the criminal proceeding.  For 
instance, the judge (by habeas 
corpus) cannot grant a new trial in 
the criminal case.  Since the 
motion remedy is in the criminal 
proceeding, this section 2 affords 
the opportunity and expressly 
gives the broad powers to set 
aside the judgment and to 
discharge the prisoner or 
resentence him or grant a new 
trial or correct the sentence as 
may appear appropriate. 
 
S. Rep. No. 1526, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the motion to vacate a sentence, which was 
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subsequently codified as § 2255,7 was viewed as a 
continuation of the criminal case in the sentencing court in 
order to alleviate practical difficulties associated with 
fragmentation, and to more evenly distribute caseloads 
amongst districts.  By making § 2255 proceedings a 
continuation of the criminal case, Congress also gave federal 
courts broader procedural latitude than in § 22548
 
 habeas 
actions.  The latter were viewed as initiating federal civil suits 
that were separate from prisoners’ prior state criminal cases. 
C. 
 
 Congress’s intent regarding the procedural posture of 
§§ 2254 and 2255 is reflected in the titles Congress adopted 
in promulgating each section’s procedural rules; namely, the 
“Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States 
District Courts,” and the “Rules Governing Section 2255 
Proceedings in the United States District Courts.”  (emphasis 
added).  The Advisory Committee on the Rules Governing §§ 
2254 and 2255 repeatedly reinforces this distinction in its 
commentary for the Rules.  Specifically, under Rule 1 of § 
2255, titled “Scope,” the Advisory Committee explains that a 
                                                 
7  “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established 
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that was 
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which 
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
 
8  “The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  In addition, though 
broader procedural latitude exists under § 2255, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that the scope of remedy under §§ 2254 
and 2255 is the same.  See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353 
(1994); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974). 
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habeas “motion under § 2255 is a further step in a movant’s 
criminal case and not a separate civil action” and, by contrast, 
§ 2254 “habeas corpus is a separate civil action and not a 
further step in the criminal case in which a petitioner is 
sentenced.”  Rule 1, Advis. Comm. Notes.  Under Rule 3, the 
Committee explains that “as in other motions filed in a 
criminal action, there is no requirement of a filing fee.  It is 
appropriate that the present situation of docketing a § 2255 
motion as a new action and charging a $15 fee be remedied . . 
.”  Rule 3, Advis. Comm. Notes.  Similarly, Rule 4’s 
commentary provides that “[s]ince the motion is part of the 
criminal action in which was entered the judgment to which it 
is directed, the files, records, transcripts, and correspondence 
relating to that judgment are automatically available to the 
judge in his consideration of the motion.  He no longer need 
order them incorporated for that purpose.”  Rule 4, Advis. 
Comm. Notes.  The Committee also explains that Rule 6 
pertaining to § 2255 “differs from the corresponding 
discovery rule under the § 2254 rules in that it includes the 
processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure as well as the civil.  This is because of the 
nature of a § 2255 motion as a continuing part of the criminal 
proceeding . . .”  Rule 6, Advis. Comm. Notes; see also 
United States v. Goodman, 590 F.2d 705, 712-13 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
 
 This interpretation of § 2255 is consistent with 
instances in which Congress and the Advisory Committee use 
the words “motion” and “petition” when referring to §§ 2255 
and 2254, respectively, in a manner that highlights each 
measures’ distinct procedural posture.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “motion” as “[a] written or oral 
application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or 
order.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1106 (9th ed. 2009).  By 
contrast, “petition” is defined as “[a] formal written request 
presented to a court or other official body,” and “[i]n some 
cases, the first pleading in a lawsuit.”  Id. at 1261-62 
(emphasis added).  This difference parallels the common 
understanding that “motion” often refers to a request 
submitted to a court during an action, while “petition” 
typically refers to the commencement of an action.  Thus, the 
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Senate Report discussed above,9 referring to §§ 2254 and 
2255 as Sections 1 and 2, respectively, provided that “a 
petition for habeas corpus may be filed before any circuit or 
district judge (within the circuit or district where the 
petitioner is confined)” and, by contrast, “[s]ection 2 . . . 
creates a statutory remedy consisting of a motion before the 
court where a movant was convicted.”  S. Rep. No. 1526, at 
1-2 (emphasis added).  Similarly, under Rule 2 of § 2255, the 
Advisory Committee emphasizes this distinction by 
explaining that “[u]nder these rules the application for relief 
is in the form of a motion rather than a petition . . . . 
[t]herefore, there is no requirement that the movant name a 
respondent.”  Rules 2, Advis. Comm. Notes.  Even more 
convincingly, under Rule 3, the Advisory Committee 
unequivocally states that “[c]alling a § 2255 request for relief 
a motion rather than a petition militates toward charging no 
new filing fee, not an increased one.  In absence of 
convincing evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to 
suppose that Congress did not mean what it said in making a 
§ 2255 action a motion.”  Rule 3, Advis. Comm. Notes 
(emphasis added).10
 
 
D. 
 
 Our analysis is consistent with that of the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Cook, 997 
F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (10th Cir. 1993).  There, the Tenth 
Circuit held that courts should treat motions pertaining to § 
2255 proceedings as part of a defendant’s underlying criminal 
case.  See id.  Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an 
                                                 
9  See supra pp. 8-10. 
 
10  While the words “motion” and “petition” are distinguished 
in this opinion to specifically highlight §§ 2254’s and 2255’s 
distinct procedural postures, in some instances, courts use 
these words interchangeably because, at bottom, §§ 2254 and 
2255 both provide a means of habeas relief under AEDPA.  
See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312, 1318 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Andrews makes 
plain that the district court’s order on a § 2255 petition is not 
final until the court resentences the petitioner.”) (citing 
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 339 (1963)). 
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indigent prisoner can proceed in forma pauperis without 
paying otherwise applicable filing fees.  The Cook court 
explained that, prior to the “enactment of the Rules 
Governing § 2255 Proceedings, . . . this circuit, following the 
lead of the Supreme Court, interpreted § 2255 to be a separate 
civil action which required either payment of a filing fee in 
the district court or leave to proceed in forma pauperis by the 
district court.”  Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).  However, it 
recognized that Rule 3 of § 2255 includes an Advisory 
Committee Note which provides that “there is no filing fee 
required of a movant under these rules.  This is a change from 
the practice of charging $15 and is done to recognize 
specifically the nature of a § 2255 motion as being a 
continuation of the criminal case whose judgment is under 
attack.”  Rule 3, Advis. Comm. Notes; Cook, 997 F.2d at 
1319.  Therefore, the court held that “§ 2255 proceedings 
were not separate civil actions, but were instead a 
continuation of the same criminal matter in which the filing 
fees or leave to proceed in forma pauperis were not required.”  
Cook, 997 F.2d at 1319 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
 Before the Rules took effect in 1977, we also viewed § 
2255 proceedings as civil actions separate from underlying 
criminal cases.  In United States v. Somers, for example, we 
stated, in a footnote, that “[t]he order from which the 
government appealed was not entered in the criminal 
proceeding, but rather in a § 2255 proceeding.  Such an action 
is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution, but is 
rather an independent civil suit.”  552 F.2d 108, 100 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (citing Helfin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 
n.7 (1959)); see also Neely v. United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 
1065-66 (3d Cir. 1976).  Somers was argued December 2, 
1976, and the Rules became effective on February 1, 1977, 
less than a month before our decision was filed.  The holding 
in Somers did not depend on that footnote, which was based 
on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence before the Rules for § 
2255 Proceedings were adopted.  Prior to their enactment, the 
Supreme Court stated that “a motion under § 2255, like a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not a proceeding in the 
original criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit.”  
Helfin, 358 U.S. at 418 n.7 (internal citation omitted).  
However, as noted in Cook, the Supreme Court’s 
“promulgation of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings 
14 
 
indicated the Court’s abandonment of its prior view that a § 
2255 motion was a separate civil action.”  Cook, 997 F.2d at 
1319 (citing Williams v. United States, 984 F.2d 28, 30 (2d 
Cir. 1993)). 
 
 Accordingly, it is now clear that, while civil in some 
respects, a § 2255 proceeding is a continuation of the 
underlying criminal case.11
 
  It necessarily follows that 
because a § 2255 motion is a continuation of a defendant’s 
criminal case, a motion for an extension of time to file a § 
2255 motion is also a continuation of the underlying criminal 
case.  Thus, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to 
rule on a § 2255 motion for an extension of time before the 
substantive motion for relief is actually filed.  The underlying 
criminal case satisfies Article III’s case or controversy 
mandate. 
III. 
 
 Having determined that the District Court had 
jurisdiction to rule on Thomas’ motion for an extension of 
time to file a § 2255 motion, we now review the propriety of 
the District Court’s denial.  As noted above, § 2255(f) 
establishes a one-year limitations period for filing § 2255 
motions.  See supra p. 3.  Here, the one-year limitations 
period began to run when Thomas’ petition for certiorari was 
denied on June 15, 2009.  See Gonzalez v. Thaler, -- U.S. --, 
                                                 
11  See Wall v. Kholi, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1289 (2011) 
(“a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is entered on the docket of 
the original criminal case and is typically referred to the judge 
who originally presided over the challenged proceedings, see 
§ 2255 Rules 3(b), 4(a), but there is no dispute that § 2255 
proceedings are ‘collateral’”);  United States v. Fiorelli, 337 
F.3d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile a § 2255 motion is 
deemed a further step in the movant’s criminal case, it is also 
considered a civil remedy for purposes of appellate 
jurisdiction.”).  For example, Rule 11(b) pertaining to § 2255 
provides that "Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 
[which concerns the time to appeal in civil cases] governs the 
time to appeal an order entered under these rules.”  Thus, 
nothing we say here conflicts with our precedent of allowing 
60 days to file a notice of appeal from a § 2255 proceeding. 
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132 S. Ct. 641, 653 (2012).  Thomas therefore had until June 
15, 2010 to file his request for relief under § 2255.  He filed 
his motion for an extension of time approximately three 
weeks before his deadline.  He requested additional time 
because he was transferred from federal to state custody for 
more than 120-days without access to legal materials. 
 
 Since we have not previously recognized that a district 
court has jurisdiction to rule on a motion for an extension of 
time to file a § 2255 motion before a substantive request for 
habeas relief is made, we have not had the opportunity to 
determine the appropriate standard of review for analyzing 
denials of such motions.  However, we have held that the 
doctrine of equitable tolling permits untimely habeas filings 
in “extraordinary situations.”  See Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of 
Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
AEDPA’s one year limitation period may be equitably tolled).  
There are no bright-line rules for determining when extra time 
should be permitted in a particular case.  See Sistrunk v. 
Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2012).  Rather, the unique 
circumstances of each defendant seeking § 2255 relief must 
be taken into account.  See Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 
399 (3d Cir. 2011).  Courts should grant a motion for an 
extension of time to file a § 2255 motion sparingly, and 
should do so only when the “principles of equity would make 
the rigid application of a limitation period unfair.”  Id. 
(quoting Miller, 145 F.3d at 618).  The Supreme Court has 
instructed that equity permits extending the statutory time 
limit when a defendant shows that (1) “he has been pursuing 
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”  
Holland v. Florida, -- U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2532-63 
(2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 
(2005)).  Mere excusable neglect is insufficient.  See 
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 142 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
 Here, Thomas failed to show that he diligently pursued 
his rights and that he was beleaguered by an extraordinary 
circumstance.  Although temporarily transferred to state 
custody, Thomas was in federal custody with access to legal 
materials for approximately nine months, including almost 
seven weeks leading up to the expiration of his limitations 
period.  Thomas provides no support for a finding that he was 
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diligent, nor does he explain the necessity of the materials he 
claims he was deprived of.  See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 
F.3d at 143 (“deprivation of legal material for a relatively 
brief time period is not sufficient to warrant tolling”).  
Although his transfer to state custody may have made it more 
difficult to file a timely § 2255 motion, increased difficulty 
does not, by itself, satisfy the required showing of 
extraordinary circumstances.  Cf. Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 
F.3d 308, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2012); Pabon, 654 F.3d at 399-400 
(holding that “equitable tolling might be warranted when a 
non-English speaking petitioner could not comply with 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations because the prison did not 
provide access to AEDPA-related materials, translation, or 
legal assistance in his or her language.”); Valverde v. Stinson, 
224 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (remanding case to district court 
for further factual development on extraordinary 
circumstances where defendant alleged that corrections 
officer intentionally confiscated his pro se habeas petition and 
related legal materials shortly before filing deadline).  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying 
Thomas’ motion for an extension of time to file a § 2255 
motion. 
 
IV. 
 
 Lastly, we note that Thomas’ COA request “comes to 
us following a protracted and convoluted series of motions.”  
United States v. Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192, 192 (3d Cir. 2006).  
As mentioned above, Thomas never filed a § 2255 motion for 
relief after his motion for an extension of time was denied.  
Rather, he filed a notice of appeal challenging the District 
Court’s order denying extra time, and a COA application that 
was referred to us by the District Court.  As a result, there is 
no order that formally grants or denies § 2255 relief.  
Nevertheless, as we have explained, Thomas failed to 
demonstrate, both before the District Court12
                                                 
12  See supra p. 3. 
 and on appeal, 
that extraordinary circumstances justify additional time based 
on equity.  Thus, the District Court’s denial of Thomas’ 
motion for an extension of time, and Thomas’ decision not to 
subsequently submit a timely § 2255 motion, effectively 
concluded his case before the District Court. 
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 Thomas asks us to remand this matter so that he may 
file a proper motion for § 2255 relief, and so that the District 
Court can again rule on whether the doctrine of equitable 
tolling should apply.  See Brief for Appellant at 20 (“The 
Court should construe Mr. Thomas’ application for a 
Certificate of Appealability as a § 2255 petition and then 
remand the case so the District Court can determine whether 
he is entitled to equitable tolling of § 2255’s one-year 
limitations period.”).  However, a perfunctory remand to 
afford Thomas the formality of filing a time-barred § 2255 
motion would be futile because that motion would clearly be 
denied as untimely.  Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 
337 (2003) (granting “a COA does not require that the appeal 
will succeed.”).  As we have explained, there is no showing 
that equitable tolling should apply. 
 
 Accordingly, based on our review of the arguments 
raised in this appeal, and in both Thomas’ COA application 
and initial motion for extra time, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying his motion for an extension of time. 
